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Abstract  
 
This book aims to provide an overview of the labour market's benchmark 
macroeconomic models. The matching models of equilibrium unemployment are, in fact, 
the primary and most popular theoretical tools used by economists to evaluate various 
labour market policies and to study one of the key macroeconomic variables: the 
unemployment rate. It has been recognised that unemployment has also a structural 
nature which persists over the business cycle. The matching models, i.e. the models à la 
Mortensen-Pissarides, explain the co-existence in equilibrium of unemployment and 
vacancies through frictions in matching workers and firms. Furthermore, these models 
generate predictions that have the right direction: unemployment goes up in recession 
and down in boom, while job vacancies shift in the opposite direction. The central role 
of these models in imperfect labour markets has recently been confirmed by the 2010 
Nobel Prize for Economy awarded to the founders of this approach: Peter Diamond, 
Dale Mortensen and Christopher Pissarides. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The matching models of equilibrium unemployment – i.e. the models à la 
Mortensen & Pissarides – are the primary and most popular theoretical tools used by 
academic and government economists to evaluate various economic policies and to 
study the problem of unemployment (Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008). These 
models rate the benchmark macroeconomic models of the labour market (Garibaldi, 
2006). Nowadays, the leading theory of equilibrium unemployment and vacancies is 
in fact the Mortensen-Pissarides model, which explains the co-existence of 
unemployment and vacancies through frictions in matching workers and firms. 
Furthermore, from an empirical point of view, these models appear to satisfactorily 
explain what occurs in reality: « […] in calibrations, matching models are usually 
compared with Hansen’s calibrated model and are shown to perform at least as 
well.» (Pissarides, 2000, p. 36). The central role of these models in imperfect labour 
markets has recently been confirmed by the 2010 Nobel Prize for economy awarded 
to the founders of this approach: Peter Diamond, Dale Mortensen and Christopher 
Pissarides.  
The awareness of the fact that modern labour markets are characterised by 
large flows, both of workers in and out of employment and of work positions created 
and destroyed by firms, has led to this new theoretical approach whose main scope is 
to derive an empirically realistic equilibrium unemployment theory, in which 
unemployment persists in equilibrium. 
The flow of workers between employment, unemployment and inactivity, 
and the rich dynamics behind them, is a characteristic common to both the American 
(Blanchard and Diamond, 1990a) and European (Burda and Wyplosz, 1994) labour 
market. Although these flows are in theory compatible with labour turnover over a 
fixed number of jobs, the reallocation of workers is actually associated with 
substantial annual flows in job creation and destruction at the single firm level 
(Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992). 
Even in the absence of net changes in employment, the simultaneous creation 
and destruction of jobs is intense (Bagliano and Bertola, 1999; Andolfatto, 2008). 
Figure 1 is a clear example of this: a small net change in employment, amounting to 
15.000 individuals, is consistent with approximately one million individuals 
transiting in and out of employment. 
========== Figure 1 about here (now at the end) ========== 
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The acknowledged importance of these flows in the persistence of 
unemployment, even at equilibrium, substantiates the economic mechanism 
underlying matching models: the matching process between workers and firms. 
More precisely, employment dynamics are the result of vacancies being created and 
filled by firms, and the activity of job-seekers, particularly the unemployed.1 The 
matching between a firm and worker results in a filled, and thus active, job that 
therefore produces income and is able to pay wages (Bagliano and Bertola, 1999). 
However, matching takes time to finalise since the process is characterised by 
a decentralised, uncoordinated and costly (in terms of both time and money) search 
conducted by job-seekers and firms 2 (Bagliano and Bertola, 1999). Worker-firm 
matching is not instantaneous due to the existence of frictions (i.e. search 
externalities, heterogeneity of individuals and jobs, incomplete information etc.). 
Search externalities, also known as congestion externalities are particularly relevant 
in matching models (see Pissarides, 2000). In fact, every firm that creates new jobs 
produces externalities that are positive for job-seekers (since the probability of 
finding a job increases) and negative for other firms (since the probability of filling 
existing vacancies is reduced); vice versa, an increase in job-seekers produces 
positive externalities for firms and negative externalities for other job-seekers, for 
precisely the opposite reasons.3 
 
2. FROM SEARCH FRICTIONS TO MATCHING FUNCTION 
It should be specified that the idea that labour market frictions exist and are 
significant is not unique to matching models and was already present in Hutt (1939) 
and Hicks (1963). The latter, in particular, claimed that the short-term 
disequilibrium in the labour market was due to the fact that wages were slow to 
adjust in the wake of economic shocks, and that this was attributable to existing 
frictions. This view has essentially been confirmed by more recent studies (cf. 
Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). Keynes (1936), on the other hand, basically 
                                                 
1
 Furthermore, in these models the definition of unemployment is consistent with that typically 
used in national job-force surveys: individuals are considered unemployed when they do not 
have a job but are actively searching for one (Andolfatto, 2008).  
2
 This differs from the traditional neoclassic model in which the matching process is centralised 
and coordinated, and work demand and offer are instantly balanced by variations in wages. 
3
 In the matching framework, firms and workers have completely rational expectations, i.e. they 
are fully aware of the matching process. Nonetheless, they act independently, without 
attempting to coordinate their actions (Pissarides, 2000).  
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coined the term “frictional unemployment”, in other words unemployment that is 
compatible with full employment, and believed that this type of unemployment was 
not particularly significant and as a consequence disagreed that frictions played a 
major role in the slow adjustment of wages. 
The work carried out in the ‘60s and ‘70s (e.g. Alchian, 1969; Phelps, 1968, 
1970, 1972; Mortensen, 1970) successively emphasised the key role played by 
search frictions and led to today’s search theory, i.e. an unemployment theory based 
on the assumption that labour-market search is an economically costly activity. 
Basically, in models where the individual must choose how to optimally divide his 
time between work and leisure, a third option is introduced: the option of searching 
for a new and/or better job. The search equilibrium has two key properties: 1) search 
frictions that introduce monopoly revenue, subdivided between firm and worker 
through wage determination once a match has been made; 2) indifference to the so 
called congestion externalities in individual optimisation problems. In essence, 
individuals ignore the effects their actions have on the aggregate probability of 
finding a job and filling a vacancy. 
Starting from the late ‘70s – early ‘80s, more analytically sophisticated 
models were constructed, now commonly known as search and matching models. 
Amongst these, a distinction can be made between those that focus on the entire 
economy, in particular on the presence of multiple equilibria (Diamond, 1982a, 
1982b, 1984), and those whose main focus is on the labour market (Pissarides, 1979, 
1984, 1985a, 1985b, 1986, 2000; Mortensen, 1987; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994, 
1998 and 1999; and Pissarides, 2000). The first models in which the matching 
function is not only present but is also the main economic mechanism underlying 
unemployment, basically replacing the reservation wage, 4  are those of Hall (1979), 
Pissarides (1979), Diamond and Maskin (1979), Bowden (1980). 
The matching function is conceptually equivalent to the production function: 
the result of the “productive process” is the creation of jobs and the “productive 
                                                 
4
 The reservation wage is the wage that leaves an individual indifferent to working or not. It is 
deduced by equalling the benefit of being employed and the opportunity cost of being 
employed. Economies with a lower reservation wage have a higher level of employment, 
however this does not necessarily imply a greater social wellbeing. There is, in fact, no a priori 
reason for believing that higher levels of employment necessarily correspond to higher levels of 
social wellbeing (Andolfatto, p. 84, 2008).  
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factors” are unemployment 5  and vacancies (Bagliano and Bertola, 1999). As a 
consequence, the use of an aggregate (macroeconomic) type function is justified by 
its empirical relevance and ability to capture the main characteristics of the matching 
process (Pissarides, 2000). In this sense, the matching function is a useful modelling 
tool, as it can describe the job formation process without having to clarify the 
reasons that make this process challenging and costly. Moreover, the matching 
function is able to grasp (as will become apparent in paragraph 4.1) variations in 
both the optimal behaviour of firms and workers 6  and the degree of mismatch 
present in the labour market.7  
From an empirical point of view, it is common in the literature to resort to the 
constant returns to scale hypothesis and utilise a Cobb-Douglas type function to 
describe the matching process. Both of these assumptions are empirically supported 
(Blanchard and Diamond, 1989, 1990b; Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 
2001; Stevens, 2007). However, although the choice of a Cobb-Douglas type 
function is common in the literature, its application lacks a convincing theoretical 
explanation. It is, in fact, employed mainly due to empirical evidence and not 
because of consensus at the theoretical (microeconomic) level.8 
An alternative to the Cobb-Douglas matching function, which has received 
important and recent consensus, is the stock-flow matching model (Coles and Smith, 
1998; Coles and Muthoo, 1998; Lagos, 2000; Gregg and Petrongolo, 2005; Shimer, 
2007; Ebrahimy and Shimer, 2010). The idea behind this approach is the following: 
when a job-seeker enters the market searching for a job, s/he considers all the 
available vacancies and applies for the position s/he deems most adequate. If the 
response is positive, i.e. s/he is hired, s/he becomes employed and stops searching, 
whereas in the case of a negative response s/he remains in the market awaiting new 
vacancies, having already discarded the old ones. As a consequence, job-seekers are 
                                                 
5
 In the case where on-the-job search (employed individuals searching for a job) is not possible, 
the only job-seekers are the unemployed. 
6
 Consider a variation in the search intensity of workers and/or a higher or lower publicising of 
vacancies by firms. 
7
 The degree of mismatch is, in fact, an empirical concept. Its increase (decrease) indicates that 
the matching process, under the same conditions of vacancies and unemployment, has become 
more difficult (easier). 
8
 Despite its importance, few attempts have been made at microfounding the matching function 
and, above all, no microfoundation is better than another (Pissarides, 2000). The aggregate-type 
matching function is, in fact, usually described as a “black-box” (cf. Petrongolo and Pissarides, 
2001). 
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initially flows and vacancies are stock, while successively job-seekers are stock and 
vacancies are flows.9 
 
3. THE NEGATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VACANCIES AND 
UNEMPLOYMENT: THE “BEVERIDGE CURVE” 
Long before the appearance of the matching function in the literature, there 
was another important analytical tool: the Beveridge Curve. The Beveridge Curve is 
still used today for analysing unemployment and it describes the negative 
relationship between unemployment and job vacancies. This relationship is 
empirically proven (an example is shown in figure 2) and fully intuitive, since an 
increase in vacancies corresponds to a decrease in unemployment, and vice versa.   
========== Figure 2 about here (now at the end) ========== 
The Beveridge Curve was discovered by, and is named after, the British 
social economist William Beveridge (1944). 
Pioneeristic work on the Beveridge Curve, independent of the existence of a 
matching function, was carried out by Dow and Dicks-Mireaux (1958), Holt and 
David (1966), Hansen (1970). 
The first studies analysed the interactions between vacancies and 
unemployment in order to derive a more solid equilibrium unemployment theory, 
with renewed interest in the Phillips Curve and the natural rate of unemployment 
theory (Phelps, 1967; Friedman, 1968). Successive studies focused instead on two 
primary goals: a) understanding the employment dynamics of the modern labour 
market; b) building new macroeconomic models with frictions able to adequately 
explain these dynamics (cf. Pissarides, 2000).  
A phenomenon related to the Beveridge Curve, that is sufficiently widespread 
to have earned the status of “basic fact” of the economic cycle, is the following: 
during periods of growth and recession, vacancies and unemployment follow 
anticlockwise trajectories around the Beveridge Curve (cf. figure 3).  
========== Figure 3 about here (now at the end) ========== 
As shown in figure 3, the effects produced by the economic cycle are 
completely intuitive. In fact, under economic growth (recession) the new 
equilibrium will be characterised by more (fewer) vacancies and lower (more) 
                                                 
9
 Considering the significant and recent interest generated, the last paragraph of this work will 
be dedicated to the stock-flow matching model. 
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unemployment. This phenomenon, described ever since the first empirical studies 
carried out with the Beveridge Curve (Dow and Dicks-Mireaux, 1958; Holt and 
David, 1966), is captured by the basic matching model. More precisely, if during the 
economic cycle a straight line with slope equal to the vacancy – unemployment ratio 
is traced from the origin (cf. figure 3), vacancies and unemployment follow 
anticlockwise trajectories around the Beveridge Curve, subsequent to productivity 
shocks (cf. Pissarides, p. 32, 2000). Intuitively, after an increase (reduction) in 
productivity, the straight line out of the origin will be displaced towards the top 
(bottom), since an increase (decrease) in productivity increases (decreases) the 
advantage for firms to create new vacancies. The microeconomic reasoning behind 
this is the following: when firms anticipate a decrease in unemployment, they aim to 
keep fewer vacancies open in the future since they will be more difficult to fill; 
however, in order to have fewer vacancies in the future, more vacancies need to be 
opened in the present. These are the dynamics described by the anticlockwise 
trajectories that vacancies and unemployment trace in periods of economic growth.10 
Essentially, this causes a larger variation in vacancies at the beginning of the 
adjustment period than once equilibrium has been reached. According to Phelps 
(1968), Hansen (1970) and Bowden (1980), the insight underlying this phenomenon 
is that job demand is more flexible than job offer. 
Finally, as far as the empirical estimate provided by the Beveridge Curve is 
concerned, there is wide consensus over its outward shift for the majority of 
European countries, corresponding to the increase in unemployment registered over 
the last thirty years. The explanations accounting for this change, however, differ: 
increase of long-term unemployment (Budd et al., 1988), generosity of the 
employment protection mechanisms and unemployment benefits (Jackman et al., 
1989), and lack of suitable active labour market policies (Jackman et al., 1990). 
 
4. THE BASIC MATCHING FRAMEWORK: THE MORTENSEN–PISSARIDES 
MODEL 
4.1 The decentralised equilibrium 
This paragraph will introduce the matching model commonly used in 
theoretical analyses. 
                                                 
10
 The opposite reasoning can be applied to the case in which firms foresee an increase in 
unemployment. 
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It is common practice with matching models to consider a match between job 
and worker as a firm, in other words to assume that each firm only employs one 
worker (one-job-firm). The following approach essentially focuses on analysing the 
match rather than the firm.11 
As previously mentioned, the main element underlying these models is the 
matching function, which expresses the number of jobs created in any given moment 
in time ( LmM ⋅= ) as a function of the total number of unemployed workers 
( LuU ⋅= ) and of vacancies ( LvV ⋅= ): 
( ) ( )LvLumLmVUmM ⋅⋅=⋅⇒= ,,  
where m , u  and v  are, respectively, the rate of matching, unemployment and 
vacancy, whereas L is the labour force (generally normalised to 1 and assumed to be 
constant in time). The matching function basically describes the efficiency of the 
matching process, highlighting the importance of the two inputs (vacancies and job-
seekers) in the creation of jobs (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). 
If there were no frictions in the matching process, in other words if a vacancy 
were immediately filled, the number of jobs created would be defined by the 
minimum between the number of unemployed workers and the number of vacancies, 
i.e. ( )LvLuM ⋅⋅= ,min . However, the presence of frictions determines a lower 
number of jobs given the same number of vacancies, i.e. 
( ) ( )LvLumLvLu ⋅⋅≥⋅⋅ ,,min . 
Assuming, as is common in the literature, that the matching function is 
increasing and concave in both arguments and degree 1 homogeneous (i.e. 
characterised by constant returns to scale), the rates can be simplified and the 
expression rewritten as:   
( ) ( )vummvumLLm ,, =⇒⋅=⋅  
Resorting to the commonly used Cobb-Douglas functional form, the matching 
function becomes: 
αα −
⋅=
1vum  
where 10 <<α  is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to the 
unemployment rate: 
ααε
αα
αα
=
⋅
⋅⋅⋅⇒⋅
∂
∂
=
−
−−
1
11
 ,
vu
u
vu
m
u
u
m
um  
                                                 
11
 Matching models that disregard the commonly accepted one-job-firm hypothesis are those of 
Bertola and Caballerro (1994) and Garibaldi (2006). 
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Furthermore, the constant returns to scale hypothesis allows attention to be 
focalised on a single variable, θ , which expresses the relationship between 
vacancies and unemployment, i.e. uv /≡θ .12 
The matching function can be used to calculate both the rate with which an 
unemployed worker finds a job: 
α
ααα
θ −
−
−
≡





⇒
⋅ 1
11
u
v
u
vu
 
and the rate with which a vacant position is filled: 
α
ααα
θ −
−
−
≡





⇒
⋅
u
v
v
vu 1
 
αθ −1  and αθ −  are the two rates that characterise the matching process and express, 
respectively, the instantaneous probability of finding a job and of filling a vacancy. 
It immediately follows that the instantaneous probability of finding a job is positive-
concave with regards to the vacancies-unemployment ratio, whereas the probability 
of filling a vacancy is negative-convex. Furthermore, these instantaneous 
probabilities can (theoretically) tend to infinity in an infinitesimal time interval, dt. 
In particular: 
0limlim 10 ==
−
∞→
−
→
α
θ
α
θ θθ  ∞== −→−∞→ αθαθ θθ 01 limlim  
It must be pointed out that these properties hold true independently of whether a 
Cobb-Douglas functional form is used.13 
Employment (n), evolves over time in accordance to inflows (filled 
vacancies, unemployed workers finding a job) and outflows (existing jobs destroyed 
with exogenous rate δ ).14 Consequently, the change in employment over time can 
be expressed as both a function of the firm’s transition rate, αθ − , 
                                                 
12
 In empirical calibrations, it is common practice to introduce a multiplicative factor to the 
matching function, i.e. m = µ uα v(1 – α), in order to account for the degree of mismatch which, 
under the same conditions of vacancies and unemployment, makes the matching process more 
or less difficult. It follows that the larger µ is, the more efficient the matching process and 
therefore the smaller the degree of mismatch. Moreover, as the search intensity and the posting 
of vacancies may be seen as parameters of technological change in the matching function (see 
Pissarides, p. 124, 2000), in accordance with the hypothesis of constant returns to scale, the 
parameter µ may represent the intensity both of job search by individuals and of vacancy 
posting by firms, as long as the two parameters are assumed equal, i.e. m = (µu)α (µv)(1 – α), from 
which m = µ uα v(1 – α) is derived. 
13
 In order to simplify the explanations and for greater clarity the Cobb-Douglas functional form 
will be used throughout this work.  
14
 Jobs are destroyed following shocks specific to the firm, such as technological-organisational 
changes. 
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δθ α ⋅−⋅=≡ − nv
dt
dn
n&  
and as a function of the worker’s transition rate, αθ −1 , 
δθ α ⋅−⋅=≡ − nu
dt
dn
n 1&  
as a result, it must be true that: 
u
v
nunv a =⇒⋅−⋅=⋅−⋅ −− θδθδθ α1  
The relationship between the vacancy rate and the unemployment rate represents a 
measure of labour market tightness, and as already seen, the probability of finding a 
job and of filling a vacancy depends on this. The chosen reference point is of utmost 
importance in understanding how this variable describes labour market frictions: 
indeed, for the firm, an increase in θ
 
makes filling a vacancy more difficult due to 
the so called congestion externalities; vice versa the situation is improved for the 
worker since it becomes easier to find a job (the so called positive externalities 
derived from a “denser” market). In matching models it is common practice to take 
the firm’s point of view as reference, in other words an increase in labour market 
tensions (or tightness) is associated with an increase in θ . 
As previously mentioned, another fundamental labour market analysis tool, 
often associated with the matching function, is the Beveridge Curve, i.e. the inverse 
relationship between unemployment and vacancy rate. This relationship can be 
easily obtained from the following expression, which describes how the 
unemployment rate changes over time: 
( ) αθδ −⋅−⋅−= 11 uuu&  
( ) δ⋅− u1  represents unemployment inflows, i.e. existing jobs destroyed at rate δ , 
( un +=1  is, in fact, the normalised labour force), whereas αθ −⋅ 1u describes the 
unemployment outflows, i.e. unemployed workers that find a job.  In steady state 
equilibrium, where unemployment is constant over time ( 0=u& ), it follows that: 
αθδ
δ
−+
= 1u  
this equation expresses the reverse relationship between unemployment, u, and the 
measure of labour market frictions θ
 
(and, therefore, between u  and v ), and is 
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known as the Beveridge Curve (BC).15 The convergence to the equilibrium value of 
u , given any initial level 0u , is guaranteed due to the negative sign of uu ∂∂ /& , 
( )αθδ −+−=∂∂ 1/ uu&  
where ( )αθδ −+ 1  indicates the rate of convergence. 
In order to calculate the equilibrium value of θ , it is necessary to introduce 
the so called Bellman equations, named after the mathematician Richard Bellman 
who originally presented them in the ‘50s. The Bellman equations describe the 
expected marginal values (from which the interest rate r has been deducted) 
associated with the differing conditions of labour market participants, basically 
comparing them to financial securities.16 Formally, and very generally, the Bellman 
equations associated with the employment value (W), with the unemployment value 
(U), with the vacancy value (V) and the filled job value (J), are the following: 
( ) WWUwWr &+−⋅+=⋅ δ  
( ) UUWzUr &+−⋅+=⋅ −αθ 1  
( ) VVJcVr &+−⋅+−=⋅ −αθ  
( ) JJVwyJr &+−⋅+−=⋅ δ  
the terms on the right hand side of the expressions are, respectively, the “dividends” 
associated with the different conditions (w = wage rate, z = employment opportunity 
cost, c = cost of opening a vacancy and y = productivity) and the “capital gains or 
losses”, in other words the transition from one condition to the other, influenced by 
the probability of finding a job, of filling a vacancy and by the job destruction rate.17 
Finally, dtdXX /≡&
 
(where JVUWX ,, ,= ) indicates the change over time of the 
presently considered deducted value. The equilibrium usually characterised by these 
                                                 
15
 The Beveridge Curve is not only decreasing but is also convex. In fact: 
( )
( ) 0
1
21
<
+
⋅−⋅
−=
∂
∂
−
−
α
α
θδ
θαδ
θ
u
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 0
1211
41
1211
2
2
>
+
⋅−⋅+⋅⋅⋅−⋅++⋅⋅−⋅⋅
=
∂
∂
−
−−−−−−
α
ααααα
θδ
θαθδθαδθδθαδα
θ
u
. 
16
 It is common practice in the literature to make use of linear utility functions. Assuming that 
individuals are risk neutral not only simplifies the analysis, but also allows to focus on the 
consequences of the search and matching process rather than on the deficiencies of the 
insurance markets. 
17
 Intuitively, the transition from unemployed (vacancy) to employed (filled vacancy) is 
profitable for the worker (firm). In fact, necessary conditions for non trivial equilibria are W ≥ U 
and J ≥ V. 
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models is the “ideal” stationary state, in which the values of the variables are not 
subject to further changes over time. It therefore follows that 0=X& X∀ .    
The condition which allows the equilibrium value θ  to be determined is 
known as the zero-profit or free-entry condition: a firm will continue to open new 
vacancies until the value of a further vacancy becomes equal to zero. In equilibrium, 
in fact, all the profit opportunities derived from opening new vacancies have been 
exploited, therefore the value of an additional vacancy is equal to zero.18 Setting 
0=V
 in the Bellman equations relative to the value of a filled position and of a 
vacancy, the following is obtained: 
( )
( )
α
α
α
δθδθ
θ
δ 1






+⋅
−
=⇒
+
−
=⋅⇒




=
−=⋅+
−
rc
wy
r
wy
c
Jc
wyJr
 
The former expression, which shows an inverse relationship between θ  and w , is 
known as the Job Creation Condition (JCC).19 Essentially, the net gain deducted by 
the firm must cover the expected costs associated with opening a vacancy (the 
reciprocal probability of filling a vacancy αα θθ ≡−/1  is, in fact, the average length 
of time for which a vacancy is filled).20 
With regards to w , wages can be determined in several ways,21 however it is 
common practice in the literature to use the generalised Nash bargaining rule.22 
Based on this rule, the wage is determined by dividing, between firm and worker, 
the surplus generated by their matching. The optimisation problem which must be 
resolved is the following: 
( ) ( )ββ UWVJw −⋅−= −1maxarg
 
                                                 
18
 To be more precise, “at any given instant, in both stationary equilibrium and adjustment, 
firms take advantage of all profit opportunities that arise due to the opening of a vacancy: 
( ) ttV ∀=   0, . Therefore, even out of stationary equilibrium, ( ) ttV ∀=   0,& ” (Bagliano and Bertola, 
p.274, 1999). The application of the zero-profit condition, which ensures a closed-form solution 
of the model, was discussed for the first time by Pissarides (1979). 
19
 JCC can be seen as a “special” job demand curve. Indeed, if the cost of opening a vacancy 
were zero, JCC would become a standard work demand, i.e. y = w. 
20
 Similarly, the reciprocal probability of finding a job, is the average duration of 
unemployment.  
21
 See Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) for an overview. 
22
 The Nash rule is appropriate in this context, since it is assumed that both sides of the labour 
market implement costly search activities and that, therefore, a successful match is in their best 
interest. 
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where ( )1 0,∈β  is a measure of the workers’ bargaining power, namely the surplus 
quota owed to the job factor. The relative first-order condition for optimal surplus 
subdivision is given by:  
( ) ( )VJUW −⋅
−
=− β
β
1
 
from which the following final expression is obtained (see Appendix A), the so 
called Wage Setting (WS): 
( ) θβββ ⋅⋅+⋅+⋅−= cybw 1  
with 0/ >∂∂ θw , since an increase in θ  increases the probability that an 
unemployed worker finds a job, thereby improving his/her external opportunities 
and hence bargaining power. 
We now have the three key equations (Beveridge Curve, Job Creation 
Condition and Wage Setting) for representing the stationary state equilibrium 
reached in a labour market with frictions, characterised by four endogenous 
variables (θ , w , u  and v ): 
δθ
α
+
−
=⋅⇒
r
wy
c    JCC
 
( ) θβββ ⋅⋅+⋅+⋅−=⇒ cybw 1    WS  
αθδ
δ
−+
=⇒ 1    uBC  
========== Figure 4 and 5 about here (now at the end) ========== 
The equilibrium value of θ  and w  is determined by the intersection of the Job 
Creation Condition with the Wage Setting (cf. figure 4). Finally, the intersection of 
the Beveridge Curve with the origin-based segment of slope θ , allows the 
equilibrium values of u  and v  to be determined (cf. figure 5). 
 
4.2 Endogenous job destruction rate 
It is often not completely realistic to assume that the job destruction rate is 
exogenous. In some cases, in fact, the job destruction rate is more sensitive to 
economic shocks than the job creation rate (Pissarides, 2000).23 
                                                 
23
 It must be pointed out that this is, however, mainly empirical evidence relative to the US and 
not European economy (Boeri, 1996). It is probable that this depends on the restrictions present 
in the European context that make job closing difficult (Garibaldi, 1998). However, it is 
unanimously believed that job creation and destruction flows are asymmetric and that there is a 
negative correlation between the respective rates. 
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When a shock affects job productivity, the firm can decide whether to 
continue using the labour factor at the new productivity or whether to destroy it.24 
The choice is made by the firm in accordance with the so called “reserve 
productivity”, R : if the shock that affects the labour factor reduces productivity 
below this threshold, the firm will destroy the job, vice versa it will keep it open. In 
order to derive the reserve productivity, the overall productivity of the labour factor 
is indicated by xy ⋅ , where y  is a general productivity parameter, whereas x  is the 
idiosyncratic (or specific) component that describes the change in productivity 
following the shock. Moreover, it is hypothesised that x  is drawn from a known 
continuous distribution function ( )xG  and that its value is between 0 and 1.25 As a 
consequence, ( )xJ  now represents the value of a filled vacancy with idiosyncratic 
productivity x , with R  satisfying the condition ( ) 0=RJ . Following a shock, the 
firm’s best choice is to continue producing if and only if ( ) ( )RJxJ ≥ .26 
In this case, the Beveridge Curve of the model will have to account for the 
fact that not all negative shocks destroy jobs: 
( )
( ) αθδ
δ
−+⋅
⋅
= 1RG
RG
u  
( ) ( )∫−= 1 
 
  1
R
xdGxRG  is the probability that a shock lowers productivity below R  
and destroys the job. Moreover, the threshold value of R  must also satisfy the 
condition UW ≥ . The rule for determining wages (i.e. the subdivision of surplus) 
basically excludes voluntary unilateral separations, therefore, in order for the job to 
be destroyed, it is necessary that firms prefer to do without the labour, i.e. 
( ) ( )RJxJ < , but also that workers prefer to be unemployed, i.e. UW < . 
The value of a filled vacancy, with idiosyncratic productivity x , and of a 
vacancy are essentially similar to those described previously:27 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )sdGsJxJxwxyxJr
R
∫⋅+⋅−−⋅=⋅
1
 δδ  
                                                 
24
 In the presence of exogenous job destruction, the immediate destruction of the job was 
hypothesised following a negative shock. 
25
 This hypothesis can be generalised by indicating a positive value xmax  as a maximum value of 
idiosyncratic (or specific) component x. 
26
 A realistic variant of the hypothesis formulated by Pissarides (2000) could foresee job closure 
even when J(x) = J(R) = 0. 
27
 It is assumed that all newly created jobs are characterised by maximum productivity, namely 
x = 1. 
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( )[ ]VJcVr −⋅+−=⋅ − 1αθ  
when the shock hits, the firm must discard the value ( )xJ  for another value, ( )sJ , as 
long as ( ) ( )RJsJ ≥ . 
The two former equations allow the “new” JCC and Job Destruction Curve 
(JD) to be obtained, and their intersection will determine the equilibrium values of θ  
and R  (see figure 6 and Appendix B): 
========== Figure 6 about here (now at the end) ========== 
( )
( ) ( )Rr
yc
−⋅
+
⋅−
=⇒
−
11    δ
β
θ α
JCC  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )sdGRsry
c
y
bR
R
∫ −⋅+
+
⋅−
⋅⋅
−−=⇒
1
 
1
0    δ
δ
β
θβ
JD  
The results are completely intuitive. JCC has a negative slope even in the ( )R ,θ  
interval: in fact, if R increases, the average duration of a job is reduced, and it is for 
this reason that the firm opens fewer vacancies, thereby decreasing θ . By inverse 
reasoning, JD increases in R  and therefore has a positive slope in the ( )R ,θ  
interval. 
 
4.3 Labour turnover 
If the destruction of jobs by firms is the only determinant of unemployment 
inflows, i.e. the only reason for destroying a match, the rates of worker turnover and 
of job reallocation are equal. However, this assumption is not empirically realistic. 
The rate of worker turnover is, in fact, much higher than the rate of job reallocation 
(Pissarides, 2000). Negative shocks that affect firm productivity are not the only 
causes behind variations in unemployment; indeed, the main causes considered in 
the literature are: i) retirement; ii) quitting into unemployment;28 iii) labour force 
growth rate. 
Further flows from the job offer side, modelled through simple Poisson 
processes, will be introduced in this paragraph: the labour force inflow rate, b , (for 
births); the labour force outflow rate (retirement rate), d , (for deaths); the rate of 
voluntary resignation in order to find another job, q . The retirement rate is unique, 
                                                 
28
 On-the-job search (job-to-job quitting without intervening unemployment) will be discussed 
in more detail in paragraph 6.3. 
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regardless of whether the worker is employed or unemployed, whereas all the “new” 
workers initially enter the unemployed pool.  
The rate of labour force growth can be expressed as the difference between 
labour force inflows and outflows, for any initial level, ( )0L . In fact, given the 
labour force at time t: 
( ) ( ) ( ) tdbeLtL ⋅−⋅= 0  
from the natural logarithms and deriving with respect to time, we obtain:  
db
L
L
−=
&
 
The model presented in this paragraph has three differences with respect to 
the model developed in Pissarides (cf. chapter 4, 2000): 
i) The job destruction rate is, for simplicity, considered to be exogenous and 
constant; 
ii) In case of job destruction, i.e. worker layoff, the firm must pay a fixed cost, F ; 
iii) In case of retirement, the worker receives a constant (expected) 
income discounted of benefits (i.e. his pension). 
The (partially) modified Bellman equations are, therefore: 
( ) [ ]JVdqFwyrJ −⋅+++⋅−−= δδ  
( ) [ ] [ ]WPdWUqwrW −⋅+−⋅++= δ  
[ ] [ ]UPdUWzrU −⋅+−⋅+= −αθ 1  
It immediately follows that the value of θ  is now lower than the value calculated in 
absence of retirement, worker resignation and inflow of new job-seekers: 
( )dqr
Fwyc
+++
⋅−−
=
− δ
δ
θ α
 
in fact, the rates of retirement and resignation increase the discount rate of the 
marginal value of a filled vacancy and the fixed cost, F, reduces the “dividends”.  
The variation over time in unemployment ( Lu ⋅ ) is now given by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) LuLudLbLuqLu
dt
d
⋅⋅−⋅⋅−⋅+⋅−⋅+=⋅ −αθδ 11  
since ( ) LuLuLu
dt
d && ⋅+⋅=⋅ , it follows that: 
( ) ( ) ( )dbuuudbuqu −⋅−⋅−⋅−+−⋅+= −αθδ 11&  
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in stationary state, therefore: 29 
( ) ( )
444 344 21321
inflowoutflow
1 1 ubqu −⋅++=⋅− δθ α  
from this we obtain the model’s new Beveridge Curve:  
( )
αθδ
δ
−+++
++
= 1bq
bq
u  
ceteris paribus, the countries with the highest inflow, b, and/or voluntary 
resignation, q, rates should also have the highest equilibrium unemployment rates. 
The labour market inflow rate influences the Beveridge Curve, but the Job 
Creation Condition does not. This means that if b increases, unemployment and 
vacancies also increase proportionally. Intuitively, firms react to the increase in job-
seekers by increasing the number of vacancies (graphically, the Beveridge Curve 
shifts to the right). 
Only the voluntary resignation rate, q , influences both the Beveridge Curve 
and the Job Creation Condition. The overall effect of an increase in q  is an increase 
in unemployment and a decrease in labour market tensions (graphically, the 
Beveridge Curve shifts to the right and the Job Creation Condition shifts lower). 
On the other hand, an increase in the rate of labour force growth, ( )db − , 
increases vacancies and labour market tensions (graphically, the Beveridge Curve 
shifts to the right and the Job Creation Condition shifts higher). However, if the 
effect produced by the increase in b  is greater than the effect produced by the 
decrease in d , even unemployment increases, making the final variation in θ  
ambiguous. 
 
4.4 Out-of-steady-state dynamics 
This paragraph focuses on the behaviour of the unemployment rate and of 
out-of-steady-state labour market tensions, during the adjustment period that leads to 
equilibrium. 
One of the two main differential equations needed to study the dynamic of 
the model was introduced in paragraph 4.1, i.e.: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) αθδ −⋅−⋅−= 11 ttututu&  
                                                 
29
 The rate of retirement does not influence the unemployment rate since a single labour market 
outflow rate is assumed (equal for employed and unemployed). 
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from the dynamic equation that leads to the Beveridge Curve, it immediately follows 
that the “reaction” (i.e. the variation over time) of u&
 
with respect to u is negative, 
( )αθδ −+− 1 : an increase in u, in fact, reduces the inflows and increases the outflows. 
This implies (cf. figure 7) that for the points to the left and right of the curve 0=u& , 
the value of u tends to get increasingly closer to its steady state equilibrium value, 
i.e. for any initial value of 0u , unemployment always converges to its equilibrium 
value. Due to the properties of the function αθ −1 , the relationship of u&
 
with respect 
to θ  is also negative and equal to ( ) αθα −⋅−⋅− 1u . Intuitively, if the probability of 
finding a job increases, unemployment decreases. 
========== Figure 7 about here (now at the end) ========== 
On the other hand, it can be formally proven (cf. Appendix C) that the 
variation of θ  over time does not depend (in an independent manner) on the rate of 
unemployment, but only on the level of θ  and on the model’s parameters, i.e.: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
α
θβ
α
βθθ
α
δθ
αα −−
⋅
+
⋅
−⋅−⋅
−⋅
+
=
21 1 t
c
byt
t
r
t&  
with: ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0211 1 >⋅⋅−+⋅
⋅
−⋅−⋅−
−
+
=
−− αα θ
α
β
αθ
α
βα
α
δ
θ
θ
tt
c
byr
td
td &
. 
This implies that for the points lying above and below the curve 0=θ& , the value of 
θ  tends to shift increasingly further from its steady state value (cf. figure 7).  
The apparently unstable behaviour of θ  is due to the fact that firms base their 
decision to create vacancies on the future expected value of θ , and immediately 
create more vacancies if they foresee a future increase in vacant jobs in order to 
avoid creating new ones when their opening cost will be higher. In fact, the higher 
θ , the lower the probability of filling a vacancy, whereas the average duration of a 
filled vacancy increases. 
This “forward looking” attitude of firms, with regards to vacancies, makes v  
and θ  take on the characteristics of “jump” variables, i.e. they respond immediately 
to changes in parameters or expectations. For this reason, labour market tension 
immediately becomes long term and remains present throughout the entire 
adjustment period. 
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The presence of a “backward looking” variable, i.e. a predetermined variable 
(the unemployment rate), 30  and of a “forward looking” variable (the vacancy rate), 
implies a very simple adjustment dynamic that in turn implies the existence of a 
unique dynamic path (saddlepath) converging at steady state (saddlepoint), shown 
by point E in figure 8.   
========== Figure 8 about here (now at the end) ========== 
It is possible to formally verify the nature of an equilibrium saddlepoint by 
linearising the dynamic equations surrounding a generic steady state equilibrium 
point ( )θ  ,u : 

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The negative sign of the determinant of the coefficient matrix confirms the nature of 
the steady state equilibrium saddlepoint. 31 
 
5. THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL EFFICIENCY IN THE DECENTRALISED 
EQUILIBRIUM 
The existence of externalities, and the fact that they are not taken into 
account by individual optimisation problems, immediately questions the social 
efficiency of the decentralised equilibrium.  
As shown in Pissarides (chapter 8, 2000) and Bagliano-Bertola (paragraph 
5.4, 1999), the decentralised market equilibrium achieved in the matching models 
coincides with the socially efficient equilibrium solution, in other words, it is 
efficient when the surplus quota owed to the labour factor is equal to the elasticity 
(with respect to θ ) of the average duration of a vacancy (specifically when αβ = ).32  
Formally, the condition αβ =  can be derived by comparing the decentralised 
solution, put in place by a representative firm, and the socially efficient solution, put 
                                                 
30
 The variations in u are mediated by the matching process. In fact, as v (and therefore θ) 
varies, unemployment also varies due the change in the probability of finding a job.  
31
 In order to have equilibrium stability, the matrix trace must be negative. In fact, “The 
equilibrium is a node that can be stable or unstable depending on whether the matrix trace is, 
respectively, smaller than or larger than zero” (cf. Bagliano and Bertola, p.259, 1999). 
32
 The average duration of a vacancy is the reciprocal of the probability of filling a vacancy, i.e. 
θ
 a
. The hypothesis of constant returns to scale implies that the elasticity with respect to θ of the 
average duration of a vacancy is equal to the elasticity of the matching function with respect to 
the unemployment rate. According to Cobb-Douglas, this elasticity is equal to α. 
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in place by a social planner. The solutions of the respective optimisation problems 
are the following (cf. Appendix D): 
Decentralised solution Socially efficient solution 
αθδ −=+
− c
r
wy
 ( ) ( ) αα θαθαδ −− ⋅−=⋅++
−
11
c
r
by
 
 
where b is the utility flow due to unemployed workers (i.e. the unemployment 
benefit). By comparing the two Job Creation Conditions it is deduced that: 
a) The “social” discount rate is larger than the “individual” rate 
( ) ( )δθαδ α +>⋅++ − rr 1 . In fact, in the socially efficient solution, congestion 
externalities created by an increase in vacancies, and therefore θ , are taken into 
account. Therefore, in the socially efficient solution, the marginal value of a 
filled vacancy is discounted at a higher rate. 
b) The decentralised solution attributes a lower net productivity to a filled job than 
the socially efficient solution, since bw ≥ .33 
c) The expected cost of a filled vacancy evaluated by the socially efficient solution 
is larger than the estimated provided by the decentralised solution: 
( ) αα θαθ ⋅>−⋅ cc 1/ . This means that, with respect to the decentralised 
solution, the social planner will open a smaller number of vacancies so as not to 
further increase the average duration, and therefore the expected cost, of a 
vacancy. 
Basically, the two solutions differ due to interest in congestion externalities in the 
centralised solution and the presence of wages in the decentralised solution. For this 
reason, the decentralised equilibrium will most probably be inefficient, since the rule 
for determining wages by subdividing the surplus between matched workers and 
firms neglects those (vacancies and unemployed) that are still engaged in search 
activities.  
The decentralised market equilibrium coincides with the socially efficient 
solution and, consequently, the wage determined by the Nash rule “internalises” the 
research externalities, when the following is true:  
( ) UWJ
c
−+=
⋅−
−αθα1
 
                                                 
33
 The socially efficient solution disregards wages (since it simply constitutes a transfer of 
income between firms and workers) and considers the utility flows due to unemployed workers. 
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the efficiency condition requires that the expected cost of a filled vacancy, evaluated 
by the socially efficient solution, be equal to the surplus created by a match (in 
equilibrium 0=V ). Combining the former expression with the optimisation 
condition  JUW ⋅
−
=− β
β
1
, it follows that:    
( ) J
c
⋅
−
=
⋅−
− βθα α 1
1
1
 
( ) αα θβθα −− ⋅−=⋅−⇒
cc
1
1
1
 
where J  is the expected cost of a filled vacancy, obtained from the optimisation 
condition in the decentralised equilibrium. The efficiency condition is therefore: 34  
βααβ =⇒−=− 11  
It should be stressed that social efficiency is most influenced by the 
allocation of resources, and whether or not an efficient decentralised equilibrium is 
reached. Unemployment is, in fact, probably the most significant result of the chosen 
mechanism for resource allocation, but it is not the cause of non efficient allocation. 
When αβ ≠  the allocation of resources is not efficient since:  
i. if αβ > , firms create fewer jobs and workers search with less intensity since 
the reserve wage is excessively high (result: high unemployment); 
ii. if αβ < , the reserve wage is too low and, as a consequence, workers accept a 
job too easily (result: underemployment). 
Therefore, very generally, equilibrium unemployment is greater than the socially 
efficient rate if αβ > , whereas the reverse is true for αβ < . 
 
6. THE MAIN EXTENSIONS OF THE BASIC MATCHING FRAMEWORK 
6.1 Model with career choice 
Since the deliberate focus of these models is on the labour market, the 
matching literature wouldn’t be complete without the formalisation of an 
individual’s fundamental economic choice: the decision between entering the market 
as an entrepreneur or as a worker. However, the formalisation of this choice within a 
matching framework, is relatively recent (cf. Fonseca et al., 2001; Pissarides, 2002; 
Uren, 2007). 
                                                 
34
 It must be pointed out that β = α is the efficiency condition only when the matching function 
displays constant returns to scale. For a broader discussion on this subject see Pissarides (2000). 
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In matching models, the economic decision of an individual to become 
entrepreneur or worker is based on the comparison of the two values expected from 
labour market entry, i.e. the unemployment value and the vacancy value. 
Indeed, in Uren (2007), the equality condition: 
( ) ( )θθ rUrV =   
[ ] [ ]UWzVJcz −⋅+=−⋅+− −− αα θθ 1  
allows the equilibrium value of labour market tensions to be determined, using the 
already discussed Bellman equations:35 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 021221 =+⋅+−⋅−⋅−+−⋅⋅ −− δβθβθ αα rczyczy  
The existence and the uniqueness of the value of θ  that satisfies this former 
expression is guaranteed by the condition 02 >⋅− zy  (see Appendix E).36 
Unlike the case of the basic model used in paragraph 4.1, the free-entry 
condition ( 0=V ) is no longer used to determine the equilibrium value of θ . 
Intuitively, in a model in which there is a fixed total number of firms, there is no 
need to apply the zero-profit condition when creating vacancies. In brief, if the 
number of firms is constant, the unrealistic possibility of infinite vacancy openings 
can never be true due to the fact that each firm only has one job/worker (one-job 
firm) 
In the models that offer a career choice, the total population (not the labour 
force) is normalised to one: 
( ) unvnll +++=+−= 11  
where ( ) vnl +=−1  and unl +=  represent, respectively, the overall quota of 
entrepreneurs and of workers in the total population. Since these are one-job firm 
models, the filled jobs, n, represent both the incumbent entrepreneurs and the 
employed workers (the vacancies, therefore, represent the entrant entrepreneurs). 
The number of entrepreneurs ( l−1 ) and of workers ( l ) is obtained from the 
equations describing how vacancies and unemployment evolve over time: 
( )[ ] vvlv ⋅−−−⋅= −αθδ 1&  
                                                 
35
 Uren (2007) uses the z notation to identify the free-time value. An entrepreneur that places a 
vacancy deducts the cost of opening a vacancy from the free-time value. Therefore, in the 
surplus calculation shown in Appendix A, the dividend associated to the vacancy value in Uren 
(2007) is z – c. As for the rest, the Bellman equations are analogous to those already seen.  
36
 This condition arises since a job match generates p units of output but requires the input of a 
worker and an entrepreneur. Each individual may receive a flow utility of z when unemployed. 
For gain from production to exist, p > 2⋅ z is necessary. 
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( ) uulu ⋅−−⋅= −αθδ 1&  
where ( ) vl −−1 , the difference between the total number of firms and of vacancies, 
are the filled jobs, whereas ( )ul − represents employed workers, i.e. the difference 
between the labour force and unemployed workers. It is interesting to note that, 
unlike the basic model analysed previously (in which, given u  and θ , the 
equilibrium level of vacancies is determined by the relationship θ⋅= uv ), this model 
also uses a dynamic equation for the vacancies. This is due to the fact that the new 
expression also makes explicit reference to the quota of entrepreneurs/firms in the 
total population. 
Finally, by applying the definition of labour market tensions, the values of u 
and v, obtained through use of the steady state condition 0== uv && , are used to find 
the equilibrium value of l , which completes the model (see Appendix E): 
u
v
=θ ( ) α
α
θθδ
θδ
−
−
⋅++⋅
+
=⇒ 1
1
21
l  
From an economic point of view, a clearer distinction between entrepreneurs 
and workers can be found in Fonseca et al. (2001). The authors, in fact, introduce 
entrepreneurial ability, ϑ , which follows a known distribution function, ( )ϑF , in 
the population. This ability is comprised between a positive minimum value, 
0min >ϑ , and a finite maximum value, maxϑ . 
The model’s solution is similar to that proposed by Uren, since the threshold 
value of entrepreneurial ability ( S ) is obtained from the following inequality: 
( ) ( )θθϑ rUKrV ≥−⋅  
where K is a fixed cost (start-up cost). Since ( )θV  and ( )θU are both assumed to be 
independent of ϑ , 37  the inequality satisfies the so called “reservation of 
entrepreneurial ability property”: i.e. a reservation entrepreneurial ability, S , exists, 
such that an individual becomes entrepreneur if S≥ϑ ; vice versa, for S<ϑ , s/he 
enters the market as a worker. Consequently, ( ) ( )∫−=+= max 
 
  1
ϑ
ϑϑ
S
dFnuSF
 is the 
quota of individuals that become workers, while ( ) ( )∫=+=− max 
 
  1
ϑ
ϑϑ
S
dFnvSF
 is 
the quota of entrepreneurs. Formally, the threshold value is given by: 
                                                 
37
 Entrepreneurial ability is, in fact, a simple multiplicative parameter. Matching models in 
which entrepreneurial ability influences firm productivity are those of Lisi and Pugno (2010a, 
2010b). These studies will be discussed in the following paragraph since they extend the 
matching framework of the underground economy. 
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( )
( )θ
θ
rV
KrUS +=  
with ( ) 0' >θS , since ( ) 0' <θV  and ( ) 0' >θU .38 These properties can be very simply 
illustrated through the use of the Bellman equations introduced earlier (see 
Appendix F). 
Intuitively, the Job Creation Condition (JCC) is decreasing in S, since if the 
threshold value is higher, then fewer individuals become entrepreneurs and, as a 
consequence, fewer vacancies are opened (see Appendix F). 
As illustrated graphically (cf. figure 9), the function ( )θS  assumes a small 
but positive value ( minϑ=S ) for 0=θ , and tends to infinity for sufficiently large 
values of θ  where ( ) 0=θV . Vice versa, JCC tends to zero for maxϑ=S  (the whole 
population chooses to become workers), whereas for minϑ=S  it tends to its 
maximum value ( )∞<θ .39 
========== Figure 9 about here (now at the end) ========== 
The θ  shown in figure 9 is the value of θ  that satisfies the condition ( ) 0=θV , i.e. 
the equilibrium value of θ  obtained from the standard matching model in the 
absence of entrepreneur-worker choice. Essentially, values of θ  higher than θ are 
excluded since if θθ >  then ( ) 0<θV . 
As in the Uren (2007) model, the number of entrepreneurs in the total 
population is fixed; therefore the key role of the zero-profits condition in creating 
vacancies is lost. More precisely, in the Fonseca et al. (2001) model, the cut-off 
condition (from which the threshold value of entrepreneurial ability is derived) 
determines – along with JCC – the total number of entrepreneurs (incumbent and 
entrant) and of workers (employed and unemployed). 
Finally, Pissarides (2002) basically enhances the former model. Indeed, the 
choice is now more detailed since the potential new entrepreneur also decides the 
number of job vacancies to be created and managed (γ ), based on the following 
maximisation: 
( ) ( ){ } ( )θγϑθγ
γ
rUgrV ≥⋅−⋅max  
                                                 
38
 Intuitively, this is straightforward to understand since the greater θ, the smaller the probability 
of a firm filling a vacancy, and the greater θ, the higher the probability of the worker finding a 
job. 
39
 Fonseca et al. (2001) exclude the value θ = ∞ since in this case a vacancy is never filled. 
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where ( )γg  is the cost of managing a job. It follows that, 
( ) rVg =⋅⇒ γϑ '  
i.e. the marginal cost of managing a job, ( ) 0' >γg , is equal to the marginal revenue 
from the posting of one more job vacancy. The maximisation condition is also used 
to obtain the threshold value that determines the entrepreneur-worker decision:  
( ) ( )
( )γ
θθγ
g
rUrVS −⋅=  
However, unlike the previous model, individuals now become entrepreneurs when 
S≤ϑ , since the increase in entrepreneurial ability decreases the management costs. 
Basically, the most able entrepreneurs have a lower ϑ , and therefore a lower 
management cost ( )γg . Indeed at the limit, when 0=ϑ , the management costs are 
null, ( ) 0=γg . 
 
6.2 Model with underground sector 
The use of matching models can be easily extended in order to analyse other 
important phenomena, both labour market related and non. 40  In particular, the 
persistence of the underground economy even in OECD countries – the so-called 
“shadow puzzle” (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2006) – is a very significant problem, 
strongly connected to unemployment.  
As claimed by Bouev (2005), the substantial weakness in the underground 
economy theory is the lack of proper attention towards the labour market, thus 
ignoring the fact that the decision to “go underground” is essentially the outcome of 
a worker-firm match. However, by using matching-type models it is possible to 
overcome this shortcoming.41 
The theoretical literature, which has just put together the underground 
economy theory with the Mortensen-Pissarides model, is growing and relatively 
new: see, e.g. Albrecht and Vroman (2002), Bouev (2002, 2005), Boeri and 
Garibaldi (2002, 2006), Kolm and Larsen (2003, 2008), Fugazza and Jacques 
(2004), Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2009), Albrecht et al. (2009), Lisi and Pugno 
(2010a, 2010b). 
                                                 
40
 Wasmer and Weil (2004), in fact, show that this framework can also be used to describe 
matching difficulties between financial backers (banks) and firms.  
41
 The explicit differentiation between worker and firm, in fact, exempts the need for using 
fictitious producer-consumer integration, allowing a more complete understanding of the role 
played by participants on both sides of the labour market (Laing, Palivos and Wang, 1995). 
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These models will not be described in detail since an in depth analysis of 
their results is beyond the scope of this work. Here it is more important to focus on 
the different hypotheses used for the matching process and on the results regarding 
the tight relationship between underground economy and unemployment.  
As far as the matching process is concerned, the search for a job can be 
directed or random. In the case of a directed search (see, e.g. Boeri and Garibaldi, 
2006), the unemployed workers select the sector in which to search for a job. Hence, 
there are two different matching functions, one for every sector, i.e. αα iii uvm
−
=
1
, 
where the subscript IFi ,=  denotes the sector (with F = formal and I = irregular). 
Hence, Fθ  and Iθ  represent the labour market tightness in the two sectors (obtained 
according to their respective free-entry conditions).42 
Search is random or undirected (see, e.g. Albrecht and Vroman, 2002; Kolm 
and Larsen, 2003; Bouev, 2002, 2005) when workers search for any employment 
and accept the first available job. In the presence of undirected search, both formal 
and informal vacancies have the same probability of being matched to workers. In 
this case, the total number of vacancies is entered into the matching function. 
Formally, if the matching function is again given by αα uvm −= 1 , then IF vvv +=  is 
the total number of vacancies supplied by firms and uv /=θ  is the “overall” labour 
market tightness. Hence, the worker’s transition rates into the two sectors can be 
expressed as αθκ −⋅ 1  and ( ) αθκ −⋅− 11 , where vvF /=κ  is the fraction of vacancies 
supplied in the formal sector. In short, with random or undirected search, the 
transition rate facing firms is equal across sectors and given by αθ − , whereas αθ −1  
can be interpreted as the probability of a worker getting any job offer. The random 
search assumption allows only one value of searching for a job: 
[ ] ( ) [ ]UWUWzrU IF −⋅⋅−+−⋅⋅+= −− αα θκθκ 11 1  
where FW  and IW  are the values of being employment in the two sectors. 
Finally, Lisi and Pugno (2010a, 2010b) use a “modified” directed search. In 
short, the unemployed cannot search for a job in both sectors at the same time (i.e. 
there is a directed search), but irrespective of the sector, if an unemployed person 
                                                 
42
 The elasticity of the matching function with respect to the unemployment rate in the two 
sectors may be different, but evidence is lacking in this regard. 
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fails to find a job, s/he falls back into the same pool of unemployment. Formally, 
they use the following matching function αα uvm ii
−
=
1
. 
It is interesting to note how the Bellman equations can be easily manipulated 
in order to allow them to be extended to the underground sector. For example, in 
Boeri and Garibaldi (2002), the value of a filled job in the underground sector is 
given by the following expression (recall that the subscript i = I denotes the irregular 
sector): 
( ) [ ]IIIII JVwyrJ −⋅++−−= ρδρφτ  
by definition, underground activities are subject to checks by the revenue authorities 
and the government (checks that, specifically, are given by the probability of 
discovering the illegality, ρ , that therefore represents an increased discount rate), 
and if discovered the job is destroyed and a fine φτ , equal to a multiple 1>φ  of the 
unpaid tax τ  is paid.43 
As regards the close relationships between underground employment and 
unemployment, the results are ambiguous. According to Bouev’s (2002, 2005) 
matching model, scaling down the underground sector may lead to a decrease in 
unemployment, whereas, according to Boeri and Garibaldi’s (2002, 2006) matching 
model, attempts to reduce shadow employment will result in higher open 
unemployment. 
Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2009) focus on the role of the job destruction rate. 
According to their matching model, policies that reduce the cost of formality (or 
those that increase the cost of informality) produce an increase in the share of formal 
employment while also reducing unemployment because the reallocation between 
formal and informal jobs has non-neutral effects on the unemployment rate, since 
informal jobs report much higher separation rates, given that ( ) δρδ >+ . 
In Lisi and Pugno (2010a, 2010b), the role of the monitoring parameter is 
strengthened, since any policy intended to reduce the irregular sector may also 
reduce the unemployment rate if ρ is sufficiently high. In fact, in the usual case 
                                                 
43
 The previously seen optimum rule for firms is valid even for the underground sector: in 
equilibrium, the net discounted value of a filled job must be equal to its expected cost. A very 
realistic and intuitive assumption foresees that entering the regular sector has higher costs than 
entering the underground sector. Indeed, this hypothesis is often used as one of the key criteria 
with which to distinguish the underground sector from the regular sector (cf. Gërxhani, 2004). 
As a consequence, the cost of opening a vacancy in the underground sector should be lower than 
that sustained in the regular sector. 
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where the official sector is higher than the underground one, a reduction of the 
underground sector increases unemployment if the monitoring parameter ρ is 
sufficiently low or even zero, and it decreases unemployment if ρ is sufficiently 
high. Formally, by using the steady state equilibrium conditions in the supply side of 
the labour market, 
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and given the unemployment identity IF nnLu −−= , where L  is the labour force 
and Fn  and In  are the steady state employment rates in the two sectors, it is 
straightforward to get the unemployment rate: 
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which depends on both Fv  and Iv . Hence, it is possible to find a threshold value of 
monitoring ( *ρρ = ) such that 
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, under the realistic condition that 
IF vv > . This threshold value is equal to:44 
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For mathematical details see Appendix G. 
Some of the previously cited articles introduce the hypothesis of 
heterogeneity of individuals (Fugazza and Jacques, 2004; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2006; 
Albrecht et al., 2009; Lisi and Pugno, 2010a, 2010b). Fugazza and Jacques (2004), 
Boeri and Garibaldi (2006) and Albrecht et al. (2009) take the heterogeneity present 
on the job offer side into consideration, whereas Lisi and Pugno (2010a, 2010b) 
consider the heterogeneity of the demand side. Specifically, the heterogeneity 
present in Fugazza and Jacques (2004) concerns the moral considerations brought 
into play by workers at the moment they decide in which sector to work; the 
heterogeneity introduced by Boeri and Garibaldi (2006) and Albrecht et al. (2009) 
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 In fact, if vF < vI , then the monitoring rate would be negative. 
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refers to the differing productivity of workers; finally, Lisi and Pugno (2010a, 
2010b) concentrate on the heterogeneous ability of entrepreneurs. The main results 
obtained through the introduction of the heterogeneity hypothesis into a matching 
framework with an underground sector are the following:   
i. Workers with low moral principles are willing to work in the underground 
sector (Fugazza and Jacques, 2004); 
ii. The most productive workers enter the regular sector (Boeri and Garibaldi, 
2006; Albrecht et al., 2009); 
iii. The most able entrepreneurs open a firm in the regular sector (Lisi and 
Pugno, 2010a, 2010b). 
Therefore, all workers converge on the (rather reasonable) hypothesis that the 
underground sector is a backward part of the economy. In particular, these 
theoretical conclusions account for La Porta and Shleifer’s (2008) empirical finding 
that growth requires the most productive firms, which hence cannot be informal.45 
 
6.3 Model with “on-the-job search” 
The assumption that an already employed individual may participate in the 
search process is realistic, considering the fact that the search does not end with 
employment but aims to find the best work “partner” possible. 
Having reviewed the basic matching model and its extension to the 
underground economy, the simplest (from an analytical point of view) and most 
intuitive manner to introduce the hypothesis of on-the-job search is to refer to Boeri 
and Garibaldi’s (2002) model with underground sector.46 The model makes three 
fundamental hypotheses: 
(1) Regular sector jobs are considered good jobs whereas irregular jobs are bad jobs, 
because of the differences in productivity and salary, i.e. irregular jobs are 
considered to be low productivity (assumption supported by empirical evidence). 
However, at exogenous rate λ  good jobs become bad jobs. 
(2) All jobs start out as regular, i.e. the vacancies are all good. As a consequence, 
there will be a unique θ  that only expresses the tensions in the regular sector.  
                                                 
45
 Indeed, Lisi and Pugno (2010b) use a matching framework to study the effects produced by 
the underground economy not only on unemployment but also on growth. 
46
 The model presented in this paragraph is a slightly modified version of the original. 
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(3) Considering the first hypothesis (1), the model’s job-seekers are not only the 
unemployed but also the irregularly employed. Since the unemployed and 
irregularly employed search for a regular job with the same intensity, i.e. they 
are equally good at searching for a job, the probability of finding work is the 
same, i.e. αθ −1 . Formally, this is expressed in the following Bellman equations:   
( )UWbrU good −⋅+= −αθ 1  
( ) ( ) ( )badgoodbadbadbad WWWUwrW −⋅+−⋅++−= −αθρδκ 1  
where ρ  is the probability of the irregularity being discovered, φτ , with 1>φ , is a 
multiple of the unpaid tax τ , i.e. the fine (penalty), and 0>κ  is the on-the-job 
search cost for irregular workers. Even though this cost is not present in Boeri and 
Garibaldi (2002), Pissarides (2000) considers it to be sufficiently small to make on-
the-job search optimal in some conditions. 47  Furthermore, given the model’s 
hypotheses, the tensions in the labour market are given by: 
( ) ⇒+⋅= − αα badnuvm 1
badnu
v
+
=θ  
where the sum of unemployed (u ) and underground employed ( badn ) identifies the 
overall quota of job-seekers.48 
From the view point of an irregular firm, the probability of finding a job αθ −1  
represents an additional discount rate since it reduces the average duration of 
irregular unemployment (since irregular vacancies do not exist, the job is 
immediately destroyed if the worker leaves): 
αθρδ
ρφτ
−+++
−−
= 1
r
wyJ badbadbad  
The Bellman equations that characterise the regular sector are the following 
(the exogenous rate λ  represents an additional discount rate since it reduces the 
average duration of regular unemployment): 
αθ −
=⇒=
cJV goodgood 0  
λδ
λτ
++
⋅+−−
=
r
Jwy
J badgoodgoodgood  
                                                 
47
 The on-the-job search model described by Pissarides (chapter 4, 2000) foresees a productivity 
threshold value of jobs below which it is always optimal to look for a higher productivity job. 
48
 If the hypothesis of on-the-job search is extended to the entire labour force and the labour 
force is normalised to one, there will be equality between vacancies and labour market tightness 
(θ = v). 
 32 
λδ
λδ
++
⋅+⋅+
=
r
WUw
W badgoodgood  
From the above equations, and using the now well known surplus subdivision 
rule, i.e. ii JUW ⋅
−
=− β
β
1
 (where i = good, bad), the following is obtained:49 
( )( ) ( ) ( )badgoodgoodbadgood JwyUrWw ⋅+−−⋅=−⋅⋅+−⋅+ λτββλλ 1  
( )( ) ( ) ( )ρφτββθθκ αα −−⋅=−⋅⋅+⋅+−− −− badbadgoodbad wyWUrw 111  
from which it is possible to obtain the negotiated wages in the two sectors: 
( ) ( )θτββ ⋅+−⋅+⋅−= cybw goodgood 1  
since αα θβ
βθ ⋅⋅
−
⋅+= − cbrU
1
1
, and 
( ) ( ) ( )ρφτβκβ −⋅++⋅−= badbad ybw 1  
since goodWUbrU ⋅−⋅+−=− −− αα θθ 11 . 
As shown in Pissarides (2000) and confirmed by Boeri and Garibaldi (2002), the 
salary of individuals that try to modify their occupational state (their starting 
condition) does not depend on labour market tensions. Consistent with the 
hypothesis that both sides of the market have good knowledge of the matching and 
separation process, irregular firms know that a worker will search for a regular job 
once employed, thus reducing the marginal value of a filled irregular job. However, 
the Nash rule divides the costs and benefits of on-the-job search: the worker receives 
a part of the sustained cost ( ) κβ ⋅−1 , but compensates the irregular firm for the 
procured cost by giving up part of the salary θβ ⋅⋅ c . Intuitively, the wages of job-
seekers must be lower than that of those who are not searching on-the-job. In fact, 
the irregular worker will search for regular employment if and only if: 
0>− badgood ww  
( )[ ] ( ) 011 >⋅−−⋅+−⋅−−⋅ κβθρφτβ cyy badgood  
( ) ( )[ ]θρφτβ
β
κ ⋅+−⋅−−⋅
−
<< cyy badgood 11
0  
In essence, the worker must benefit from the activity of on-the-job search, i.e. the 
search cost must not be too high. 
                                                 
49
 In Boeri and Garibaldi (2002), the bargaining power of workers is identical in both sectors. 
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In this last part, the effects of on-the-job search on the unemployment theory 
and on the efficiency problem are derived. 
Normalising the labour force to 1 and considering three possible working 
states (unemployed, irregularly employed and regularly employed), the identity of 
unemployment is the following: 
badgood nnu ++=1  
In steady state equilibrium, given the in and out flows characterising the three 
possible worker states, it follows that: 
( )
λδ
θ α
+
+⋅
=
−
bad
good
nu
n
1
 
( )
αθ
ρδδ
−
⋅++⋅
= 1
badgood nn
u  
αθρδ
λ
−++
⋅
= 1
good
bad
n
n  
The previous equations form a rank-deficient system in u, ngood and nbad, which, 
together with the unemployment identity yield the following unemployment rate:50 
( ) [ ]
[ ] [ ]δθρθλδ
θλδδλδρ
αα
α
++⋅++
++⋅++⋅
=
−−
−
11
1
u
 
The existence of on-the-job search influences unemployment only as far as the 
equilibrium value of the labour market tensions is concerned. In fact, 1lim 0 =→ uθ ; 
0lim =
∞→ uθ , by the l’Hôpital rule. In short, the unemployment theory obtained 
through the on-the-job search hypothesis, therefore, is not significantly different 
from that obtained without this hypothesis (Pissarides, 2000). 
Finally, an important consideration regarding the efficiency problem 
discussed in paragraph 5 must be made. Following Boeri and Garibaldi (2002), the 
social planner problem is reformulated considering the fact that the inflow of 
(regular) employment no longer regards only the unemployed but also a part of the 
workers (the irregular ones). The optimisation problem is now the following: 
[ ]∫
∞
⋅⋅−⋅+⋅+⋅
0
ucubnyny badbadgoodgood θ
θ
max  
subject to the constraint given by the evolution over time of (regular) employment: 
                                                 
50
 Making use of 1 = u + ngood + nbad to eliminate ngood from the other equilibrium conditions (i.e. 
ngood = 1 – u – nbad), one obtains a solvable system of two equations in two unknowns u and nbad. 
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( ) goodbadgood nnun ⋅−+⋅= − δθ α1&  
The relative first order condition for θ  is the following: 
( ) ( )badnu
uc
+⋅Λ=
⋅−
⋅
−αθα1
 
where Λ  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the marginal value of a “good” 
filled job. Now, the decentralised equilibrium does not coincide with the centralised 
equilibrium even when the efficiency condition is satisfied (i.e. even when αβ = ). 
This result is typical of models with on-the-job search and does not depend on the 
existence of an underground sector (cf. Boeri and Garibaldi, 2002). In fact, if there 
were no on-the-job search, i.e. if only u  were present in the dynamic constraint, the 
same socially optimal condition found previously would hold true (cf. Appendix D). 
 
7. STOCK-FLOW MATCHING: AN INTRODUCTION 
7.1 The basic idea 
The previously described Mortensen and Pissarides model is the main 
theoretical model used in the literature to describe how job-seekers and vacancies 
match and create a functioning job. The standard matching model is also known as 
the random matching model since the process of matching is casual, i.e. some 
matches form functioning jobs whereas others do not. 
Recently however, a (partially) alternative approach has been proposed in the 
literature. The underlying idea is that most matches occur between the inflow on one 
side of the labour market and the existing stock on the other (Coles and Smith, 1998; 
Coles and Muthoo, 1998; Lagos, 2000; Gregg and Petrongolo, 2005; Shimer, 2007; 
Ebrahimy and Shimer, 2010). For this reason, this approach is known as stock-flow 
matching. 
If a “new” job-seeker is unable to find a suitable position among the available 
jobs, s/he becomes part of the existing stock of unemployed and will have to wait for 
new vacancy inflows in order to become employed. In the same manner, if a “new” 
vacancy is not filled through the existing stock of unemployed, it will increase the 
existing vacancies stock and won’t be filled until there is new inflow of unemployed 
individuals. 
With this approach, a match is attained through the “marketplace” (i.e. 
through the internet, newspapers, employment agencies, etc.) where all parties are 
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involved in search activities for only a short period of time. Following the search 
activity, the parties will simply wait for new inflow from the other side of the market 
(Andrews et al., 2009). As a consequence, in the stock-flow matching model, 
unemployed individuals and vacancies persist in equilibrium since it is possible that 
an adequate partner with which to start a work relationship is not found during the 
brief period of time in which each party is busy searching. Not all parties are, in fact, 
constantly and actively involved in their search. 
Frictions consistent with the stock-flow matching approach and that prevent 
firms from filling their vacancies derive from the collapse of specific market sectors 
(professional and/or regional) or from skill shortages (scarcity of qualified labour) 
rather than from search externalities (Andrews et al., 2009). In any case, the frictions 
analysed by the two approaches should be seen as complementary and not 
alternative, and a more general model should take them both into consideration 
(Ebrahimy and Shimer, 2010). 
Such a model was recently calibrated and empirically tested (cf. Coles and 
Petrongolo, 2008; Ebrahimy and Shimer, 2010; Andrews et al., 2009). Coles and 
Petrongolo (2008) basically confirm the interesting point of view described by 
Lagos (2000), according to which at micro level the match occurs between flows 
and stock, whereas at the aggregate level (in steady state), the matching process 
appears to be consistent with the standard matching model. In fact, the matching 
function describes the aggregate data quite well and does not reject the constant 
returns hypothesis (Coles and Petrongolo, 2008). However, out of steady state, the 
random matching model is inconsistent with the observed in and out flow dynamics 
of vacancies and unemployment (Coles and Petrongolo, 2008). Using micro level 
data, the significant positive effect of new vacancies on the probability of finding a 
job is higher than that caused by the total vacancy stock. Similarly, the impact of 
new job-seekers on the probability of filling a new vacancy is higher than that of the 
total stock of job-seekers. This appears to illustrate the greater empirical validity of 
the stock-flow matching model (Andrews et al., 2009).  
 
7.2 The stock-flow matching model 
Following on from this reasoning, it should be clear that the standard 
matching model (i.e. the random matching model) can be considered a particular 
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case of stock-flow matching, in which matches occur between the global stock of 
vacancies and unemployed individuals.51 
Instead, in the stock-flow matching model, even flow-flow, flow-stock and 
stock-stock matches are possible. As a consequence, this approach is characterised 
by eight rather than two transition probabilities, h, (hazard rates). In fact, given the 
overall number of vacancies (V ) and unemployed (U ) and the new unemployment 
(u~ ) and vacancies ( v~ ) inflows, the following is obtained: 
( )vuhw ~,~ , ( )Vuhw ~,~ , ( )vUhw ~,~ , ( )VUhw ~,~  
( )uvh f ~,~ , ( )Uvh f ~,~ , ( )uVh f ~,~ , ( )UVh f ~,~  
Where vVV ~~ −≡  and uUU ~~ −≡ are the pre-existing stock of vacancies and job-
seekers (i.e. prior to the new inflows). The subscripts w and f identify, respectively, 
the transition probabilities of the unemployed (worker hazard rates) and of firms 
(firm hazard rates). These probabilities depend on the type of match considered. For 
example, the worker hazard rate ( )vUhw ~,~  refers to the probability that a job-seeker 
belonging to the pre-existing stock of unemployed matches with the new vacancy 
inflow. 
Intuitively, since flows are quantitatively smaller than stocks, the probability 
of finding a job and, similarly, of filling a vacancy, should be higher for the new 
flows of job-seekers (u~ ) and vacancies ( v~ ): 
( )Vuhw ~,~ > ( )vUhw ~,~ ; ( )Uvh f ~,~ > ( )uVh f ~,~  
Furthermore, under the stock-flow matching model, the job-seekers (the vacancies) 
belonging to the pre-existing stock of unemployed individuals (of vacancies) match 
almost exclusively with the new vacancy (new job-seeker) flows: 
( ) ( ) 0~,~~,~ ≈> VUhvUh ww ; ( ) ( ) 0~,~~,~ ≈> UVhuVh ff  
in fact, in the stock-flow matching model, stock-stock matches are excluded, since if 
they were profitable for both sides they would have occurred previously. However, a 
stock-stock match can occur when the searching parties modify their behaviour (by 
modifying their preferences) or, more simply, when the overall stock of vacancies 
and job-seekers is sufficiently large. 
                                                 
51
 The model analysed in this subparagraph is tightly related to the model described by Andrews 
et al. (2009). 
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In order to simplify the analysis, it is assumed that all matches become jobs 
(i.e. they are accepted). Following Andrews et al. (2009) it is possible to specify the 
hazard rates by illustrating the relationship between the standard matching model 
(random matching model) and the stock-flow matching model:52 
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The numerator on the right hand side of each equation expresses the average number 
of jobs created per unit time for each match type considered. As in standard 
matching models, the number of matches is modelled using Cobb-Douglas. The 
difference is that in the random matching model µ  is unique, regardless of the 
match type considered, i.e.: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) µµµµµ ==== VUvUVuvu wwww ~,~~,~~,~~,~  
Moreover, in order to obtain the average number of jobs, the expression 
( ) ααµ −⋅⋅⋅ 1VUw  must be multiplied by the possible matches, considered as a quota of 
the total number of matches (the total number of contacts is, obviously, UV ). 
Finally, the relative probability of finding a job is obtained by dividing the entire 
numerator by u~  or U~ , according to whether flows or stock are considered. 
For example, the probability of finding a job for a job-seeker belonging to the 
new inflow is: 
( ) ( ) ( )Vuhvuhuh www ~,~~,~ ,~ +=⋅  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]VuVvuvVUuh www ~,~~~,~~ ,~ 1 µµαα ⋅+⋅⋅⋅=⋅⇒ −−  
                                                 
52
 For simplicity, only the probabilities of finding a job are shown, however the same procedure 
can obviously be applied to obtain the vacancies’ hazard rate. 
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Similarly, the probability of finding a job for a job-seeker belonging to the pre-
existing unemployed stock is: 
( ) ( ) ( )VUhvUhUh www ~,~~,~ ,~ +=⋅  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]VUVvUvVUUh www ~,~~~,~~ ,~ 1 µµαα ⋅+⋅⋅⋅=⋅⇒ −−  
Intuitively, and as previously mentioned, in stock-flow matching the probability of a 
job-seeker belonging to the pre-existing unemployed stock finding a job should be 
(realistically) lower for two reasons: (1) stock-stock matching is improbable; (2) it is 
easier for a flow to match with a stock rather than the opposite.  
In general, the probability of finding a job depends on both the flow of new 
vacancies ( v~ ) and the pre-existing stock of vacancies (V~ ).53 
 
7.3 Stock-flow matching vs. random matching 
The empirical literature supporting the random matching model, and which 
makes extensive use of a Cobb-Douglas functional form, focuses either on the 
estimate of the matching function (using aggregate data) or on the estimate of the 
probability of finding employment using data at the individual level (Petrongolo and 
Pissarides, 2001). 
The comparison between the stock-flow matching model and the random 
matching model proposed by Andrews et al. (2009) is more precisely based on the 
estimate of the probability of finding employment using data at the microeconomic 
level. This interesting comparison is made particularly clear by the fact that Andrews 
et al. (2009) derive the standard matching model as a special case of the stock-flow 
matching model. In particular, under the null hypothesis that the true model is 
random matching, i.e.: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) µµµµµ ==== VUvUVuvuH wwww ~,~~,~~,~~,~  : 0  
the workers' log-hazard rate is simply given by (recall that 
vVVvVV ~~~~ +=⇒−≡ ):54 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ww VUh εααµ +⋅−+⋅−+= log1log1loglog  
where the non observable heterogeneity of the job-seekers is only captured by the 
                                                 
53
 Similar reasoning can obviously be extended to the probability of filling vacancies and 
depends on both the flow of new unemployed and the pre-existing stock of job-seekers. 
54
 The hypothesis that only one parameter, µ, exists implies that the number of possible matches 
over the total number of contacts is equal to 1, i.e. UV/UV. 
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error term wε . The probability of finding employment, therefore, depends only on 
the overall number of vacancies and unemployed individuals. 
Under the alternative hypothesis 1H , the stock-flow matching model is valid 
and the log-probabilities of finding employment are given by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) wwww VUVuvVvuvuh εααµµ +⋅−⋅−+⋅−+⋅=⋅ loglog1~,~~~,~~log ,~log  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) wwww VUVUvVvUvUh εααµµ +⋅−⋅−+⋅−+⋅=⋅ loglog1~,~~~,~~log ,~log  
Andrews et al. (2009) propose a very simple and intuitive method for testing the 
validity of the random matching model with respect to the stock-flow matching 
model. Formally, the following is obtained: 
( ) ( ) ( )
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under 0H  the variation of the (log) probability of finding a job with respect to a 
variation in the vacancies inflow is null (the numerator is in fact zero), whereas it is 
positive under the alternative hypothesis 1H , since ( ) ( ) 0~,~~,~ ≈> VUvU ww µµ , and 
( ) ( )Vuvu ww ~,~~,~ µµ > .55 In short, in the random matching model, the probability of 
finding a job depends only on the overall number of vacancies and of unemployed, 
therefore, the variation in the “flow – stock” composition has no effect. 
Andrews et al. (2009) find that the stock of new vacancies has a significant 
positive impact on the job-seeker hazard, over and above that of the total stock of 
vacancies. Furthermore, there is an equivalent robust result for vacancy hazards. 
Thus they find evidence in favour of stock-flow matching. 
However, an important consideration must be made. The fact that the flow of 
new vacancies has a positive impact on the probability of finding a job could be 
attributed to some form of unobservable heterogeneity. For example, a “good-jobs / 
bad-jobs” scenario could be prefigured in which the most attractive vacancies 
(usually the new ones) are filled more quickly and with greater ease (Coles and 
Petrongolo, 2008). Furthermore, as remarked by Andrews et al. (2009), the data 
                                                 
55
 The larger the flow of new vacancies, the lower the pre-existing stock of vacancies. As a 
consequence, the probability that the flow of newly unemployed matches with the pre-existing 
stock of vacancies is lower. 
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used in their empirical analyses refer to a particular labour market that offers an 
explicit matching service between job-seekers and vacancies (i.e. “The Lancashire 
Careers Service data”). 
In conclusion, the stock-flow matching approach does not infer that search 
frictions are of scarce importance, it is simply a more realistic description of the 
behaviour of players active in search activity and in the labour market, such as the 
long term unemployed and workers that are well qualified for different jobs. These 
often prefer to wait for better work opportunities on the demand side, if a suitable 
job is not immediately available (Coles and Petrongolo, 2008). 
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIXES 
 
 Appendix A 
Wages are determined starting from the first order condition for the optimal 
subdivision of surplus: 
( ) ( )ββ UWVJw −⋅−= −1maxarg
 
( ) ( )VJUW −⋅
−
=−⇒ β
β
1
 
by using the Bellman equations, it immediately follows that:
 
V
r
VwyU
r
Uw
−
+
⋅+−
⋅
−
=−
+
⋅+
⇒ δ
δ
β
β
δ
δ
1
 
( )rVwyrUw −−⋅
−
=−⇒ β
β
1
  
( ) ( )rVyrUw −⋅+⋅−=⇒ ββ1
 
since the free-entry condition ( αθ⋅=⇒= cJV 0 ) is valid, it is possible to deduce 
θβ
β
⋅⋅
−
+= cbrU
1
, from which the final expression is easily obtained: 
( ) θβββ ⋅⋅+⋅+⋅−= cybw 1
          
[A.1] 
The surplus of a job, S , is defined as the sum of the worker’s and firm’s 
value of being on the job, net of the respective external options, so that:
 
UVWJS −−+=  
applying basic algebra and using the Bellman equations the following is obtained:   
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]VJcUWzWUJVyrS −⋅+−−−⋅+−−+−⋅+= −− αα θθδ 1  
finally, knowing that  ( ) SUW ⋅=− β  and ( ) ( ) SVJ ⋅−=− β1 , we obtain:56 
( ) αα θβθβδ −− ⋅−+⋅++
+−
=
11r
cbyS                                         [A.2] 
 
 Appendix B 
In order to obtain the “new” Job Creation Condition (JCC), the equation for 
determining wages is substituted into the expression for ( )xJr ⋅ : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )sdGsJxJcxybxyxJr
R
∫⋅+⋅−







⋅⋅+⋅⋅+⋅−−⋅=⋅
1
 1 δδθβββ
44444 344444 21
 
                                                 
56
 These rates can be obtained very simply from the first order condition for determining wages, 
i.e. (W – U) = β / (1 – β) (J – V). 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )sdGsJcbxyxJr
R
∫⋅+⋅⋅−−⋅⋅−=⋅+
1
 1 δθββδ                            [B.1] 
The value of the equation [B.1] is found for Rx = , with ( ) 0=RJ : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )sdGsJcbRy
R
∫⋅+⋅⋅−−⋅⋅−=
1
 10 δθββ                                        [B.2] 
The value of the equation [B.2] is subtracted from the equation [B.1], obtaining: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )RyxyxJr ⋅−⋅⋅−=⋅+ βδ 1  
( ) ( ) ( )( )δ
β
+
⋅−⋅⋅−
=⇒
r
Ryxy
xJ 1                                                                                [B.3] 
considering equation [B.3] for 1=x , (since the firm creates new jobs with maximum 
productivity), and using the expression for ( )1J  obtained through the zero-profit 
condition, i.e.: 
( )[ ] ( )
α
α
θ
θ
−
−
=⇒−⋅+−=⋅
cJVJcVr 11  
the “new” Job Creation Condition (JCC) is obtained: 
( )
( ) ( )Rr
y
c −⋅
+
⋅−
=⋅⇒ 11    δ
βθ αJCC           [B.4] 
from which it immediately follows that 0<
dR
dθ
. 
The Job Destruction Curve is determined in the following way. Starting with 
equation [B.1]: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )sdGsJcbxyxJr
R
∫⋅+⋅⋅−−⋅⋅−=⋅+
1
 1 δθββδ  
( )sJ  is substituted with [B.3], where, obviously, sx =  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )sdGRsr
y
cbxyxJr
R
∫ −⋅+
⋅−
⋅+⋅⋅−−⋅⋅−=⋅+
1
 
11 δ
βδθββδ               [B.5] 
[B.5] is evaluated for Rx = , which is the threshold productivity value of a job, 
below which the job itself is destroyed:  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )sdGRsr
y
cbRy
R
∫ −⋅+
⋅−
⋅+⋅⋅−⋅−−⋅⋅−=
1
 
1110 δ
βδθβββ                       [B.6] 
In order to obtain a clearer expression, all the members of [B.6] are divided by 
( ) y⋅− β1 , obtaining: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )sdGRsry
c
y
bR
R
∫ −⋅+
+
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1
 
1
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δ
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θβ
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completely differentiating this equation, we obtain: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]



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−⋅
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


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r
dRd
y
c 11
1 δ
δθβ
β
, with 0>
dR
dθ
, since the last term 
between brackets is a product of two numbers, both smaller than one. 
 
 Appendix C 
The free-entry condition for equilibrium is valid even out of the stationary 
state: 
( ) ( ) ( ) αθ −=⇒= t
c
tJtV 0 t  ∀  
The same applies to the rule for subdividing surplus. The wage is, therefore, 
determined in the same way in both stationary equilibrium and during adjustment: 
( ) ( ) ( )tcybtw θβββ ⋅⋅+⋅+⋅−= 1  
The dynamic of ( )tJ  out of the equilibrium state is, instead, given by: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )tJtJtVtwytJr &+−⋅+−=⋅ δ  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )twytJrtJ −−⋅+=⇒ δ&           [C.1] 
Differentiating  ( ) ( )αθ tctJ ⋅=  with respect to time we obtain: 
( ) ( ) ( )ttctJ θθα α && ⋅⋅⋅= −1                      [C.2] 
Substituting [C.2] into [C.1], we obtain: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )twytJrttc −−⋅+=⋅⋅⋅ − δθθα α &1  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )twytcrttc +−⋅⋅+=⋅⋅⋅ − αα θδθθα &1  
Since ( ) ( )αθ tctJ ⋅= ; substituting wage into the previous expression we get: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 44444 34444 21
&
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t
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And finally we obtain the differential equation for θ : 
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with: ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0211 1 >⋅⋅−+⋅
⋅
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−
+
=
−− αα θ
α
β
αθ
α
βα
α
λ
θ
θ
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c
byr
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td &
. 
Note that the limθ→0 of the expression [C.3] tends to –∞, whereas the limθ→∞ of the 
expression [C.3] tends to +∞. 
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 Appendix D 
The representative firm i solves the following optimisation problem:57 
[ ]∫
∞
⋅−
⋅⋅−⋅−⋅
0
 dtevcnwny triii
vi
max  
subject to the constraint given by employment’s evolution over time: 
iii nvn ⋅−⋅=
− δθ α&  
The representative firm, that can open more than one vacancy at a time, takes the 
value of labour market tension as given, ignoring the effects that their own decisions 
will have on the aggregate conditions of labour market tension. Setting up the 
Hamiltonian we have that: 
( ) ( ) [ ]{ } triiiii envtvcnwnytH ⋅−− ⋅⋅−⋅⋅Λ+⋅−⋅−⋅= δθ α  
where iv  is the control variable, in  is the state variable and ( )tΛ  is the so called 
“shadow value” that specifically expresses the marginal value of a filled job for the 
firm. The optimisation solutions to the problem are the following:58 
( ) ( )[ ] 00 =⋅⋅Λ+−⇒=
∂
∂
⋅−− tr
i
etc
v
tH αθ  
( )
αθ −
=Λ⇒ ct                                                       [D.1] 
( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] trtrtr
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⋅−
⋅−⋅Λ+⋅Λ−=⋅Λ− &  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ttrwy Λ−Λ⋅+=−⇒ &δ          [D.2] 
[D.1] is a standard optimality condition: in equilibrium, the marginal value of a 
filled job must be equal to the expected cost of a vacancy. [D.2] on the other hand 
expresses the evolution in time of the marginal value of a filled vacancy. In the 
steady state, with ( ) 0=Λ t& , combining the two solutions, the standard equilibrium 
condition is obtained for the job demand side, i.e. the Job Creation Condition: 
αθδ −=+
− c
r
wy
            [D.3] 
                                                 
57
 For simplicity, as is common in matching models, it is assumed that the marginal productivity 
of labour is a linear function of employment.  
58
 The optimisation solutions also include the necessary trasversality condition: 
( ) 0=⋅⋅Λ ⋅−
∞→
i
tr
t
netlim . 
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which is exactly the same as the JCC obtained in paragraph 4.1. 
As regards the socially efficient solution, the maximisation problem is the 
following: 
( )[ ]∫
∞
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0
 1 dtevcnbny tr
v
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n
n
v
vn ⋅−





−
⋅=
−
δ
α
1
&
 
In this case, the value of labour market tension is endogenous. Moreover, the 
socially efficient solution ignores the wage and considers the utility flows obtained 
from unemployed workers, i.e. ( )nb −⋅ 1 , where the labour force is, for simplicity, 
normalised to 1; hence, ( )n−1  is the unemployment rate. As before, the optimisation 
solutions are obtained by formulating the Hamiltonian: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ } ( ) ( )[ ] trtr etrtenvvttby ⋅−⋅−−− ⋅Λ⋅−Λ−=⋅−⋅−⋅⋅⋅⋅Λ+⋅Λ−− &11 1αα αδ  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ttrby Λ−Λ⋅⋅++=−⇒ − &αθαδ 1                                                                 [D.5] 
combining [D.4] with [D.5] the marginal value of a filled job is obtained in the 
steady state, i.e. the Job Creation Condition in the decentralised equilibrium: 
( ) ( ) αα θαθαδ −− ⋅−=⋅++
−
11
c
r
by
         [D.6] 
 
 Appendix E 
Using the Bellman equations, 
( ) ( )θθ rUrV =  
( ) [ ] [ ]UWzVJcz −⋅+=−⋅+−⇒ −− αα θθ 1  
( ) SSc ⋅⋅=⋅−⋅+− −− βθβθ αα 11  
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with ( ) αα θβθβδ −− ⋅+⋅−++
+−
= 11
2
r
czyS , we obtain: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )δβθβθ αα ++−⋅−⋅−+−⋅⋅= −− rczyczy 21220 1       [E.1] 
which is defined in the following way, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )δβθβθθ αα ++−⋅−⋅−+−⋅⋅= −− rczyczyC 21221  
given the so called Inada conditions: 
010 ==
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α
θ
α
θ θθ limlim , ∞== −→−∞→ αθαθ θθ 01 limlim  
with 02 >− zy , we obtain: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 021221' 1 >−⋅−⋅⋅−−+−⋅⋅⋅−= −−− zyczyC βθαβθαθ αα  
( ) −∞=→ θθ C0lim  
( ) +∞=
∞→ θθ Clim  
as a consequence, the intermediate value theorem implies the existence of a solution 
and the monotonic nature of ( )θC guarantees uniqueness. 
Once the uniqueness of the equilibrium value of the vacancy-unemployment 
relationship is guaranteed, it is possible to describe the allocation of the individuals 
between entrepreneurship and labour force (i.e. to know the equilibrium values of 
l ). In steady state we have:   
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for the steady level of vacancies and unemployment to be consistent with the 
equilibrium value of labour market tensions, the ( )( )lu
lv
=θ  relationship must be 
respected. Solving the former expression for l , it is possible to obtain the 
equilibrium value of workers and, as a consequence, of entrepreneurs ( l−1 ): 
( ) ( )
α
αα
α θδ
θδθδ
θδ
θδ
δθ
−
−−
− +
+
⋅
−
=⇒
⋅
+
⋅
+
−⋅
=⇒
11 11
l
l
l
l
 
( ) ( ) ( )αα θδθδθ −− +⋅−=+⋅⋅⇒ 11 ll  
( ) ( ) ααα θδθδθδθ −−− +=+⋅++⋅⋅⇒ 11ll  
( ) α
α
θθδ
θδ
−
−
⋅++⋅
+
= 1
1
21
l            [E.2] 
 
 47 
 Appendix F 
From the Bellman equations, 
( )VJcVr −⋅+−=⋅ −αθ  ( )JVwyJr −⋅+−=⋅ δ  
( )WUwWr −⋅+=⋅ δ  ( )UWzUr −⋅+=⋅ −αθ 1  
very simple algebra gives: 
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Hence, it is straightforward to get: 
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θ
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true that zw > . Furthermore, 
wyrVlim rr −=→0θ , by the l’Hôpital rule; zrUlim i =→0θ  
crVlim
i
−=
∞→θ ;    wrUlim i =∞→θ , by the l’Hôpital rule. 
The evolution of employment can be expressed in terms of both firm’s 
transition rates ( αθ − ) and worker’s transition rates ( αθ −1 ), i.e.: 
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It follows that for any level of employment n, 
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Straightforward algebra gives: 
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By the properties of the matching function, the right-hand side is increasing in θ ; 
whereas, the left-hand side is decreasing in S . Therefore, 0<
dS
dθ
. 
 
 Appendix G 
Let us rewrite the unemployment rate equation as: 
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Now, let us calculate 
Iv
u
∂
∂
: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )








+
+⋅⋅+=








−⋅







+
++
∂
∂ −−
−
−−
ρδδαρδδ
αα
αα
αα 11
1
11
1 IFIF vvuLuvvu
u
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )








⋅
−
+
⋅+
−
⋅=








−⋅







+
++
∂
∂ −−
αα
αα
αα
δ
α
ρδ
α
ρδδ FI
IF
I vv
uLu
vv
u
v
1111
 
since IF vEv −= , where E  is the number of entrant entrepreneurs. Hence, we get: 
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Finally, let us find the threshold value for ρ  where 0=
∂
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u
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Figure 1. Average labour market stocks and flows, Canada (1976 – 1991) 
Source: Jones (1993), quoted in: Andolfatto (2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Canadian unemployment and vacancies rates (1966 – 1988). 
Source: Jones (1993), quoted in: Andolfatto (2008) 
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Figure 3. Beveridge curve and business cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Equilibrium wage and market tightness 
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Figure 5. Equilibrium vacancies and unemployment 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Equilibrium reservation productivity and market tightness 
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Figure 7. Out-of-steady-state dynamics of unemployment and market tightness 
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Figure 8. Adjustment paths in labour-market tightness and unemployment space 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Equilibrium reservation (entrepreneurial) ability and market tightness 
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